Orienting to affect in services for people with severe or profound intellectual disabilities:A UK-based investigation by Walton, Chris et al.
Orienting to affect 
 
Orienting to affect in services for people with severe or profound intellectual disabilities: A 
UK-based investigation  
 
 












Dept. of Social Sciences
 
Loughborough University 





Dept. of Psychology 























The research reported here was facilitated by grant number Res-148-25-0002 from the United 
Kingdom ESRC. 
  
Orienting to affect 
 





This study argues for displays of affect by people with severe or profound intellectual 
disabilities to be analysed in the course of everyday interactions with the people who support 
them. 
Method 
Conversation Analysis is applied to the affective displays of residents of a social care service 
for people with severe or profound intellectual disabilities to identify how such displays are 
taken up and form the basis for further action. 
Results 
Three types of orientations to affect are identified: where the cause of the affect is unknown; 
where there is a proximal cause; and, where the proximal cause is a prior action by a member 
of staff. Staff orient to affect as expressions of both feelings and cognitions, thereby 
providing the basis for self-determination.  
Conclusions 
Displays of affect are a communicative resource for those with severe or profound 
impairments and must be studied in situ if they are to inform policy and everyday practice.  
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Introduction 
The emotional lives of people with severe or profound intellectual disabilities (SPID) have 
attracted increased attention in the last 16 years (for general reviews see Adams & Oliver, 
2011; Arthur, 2003; Boiger & Mesquita, 2012). This interest is motivated, at least in part, by 
a greater emphasis on the subjective well-being and general quality of life (QoL) of adults 
with intellectual disabilities (ID) at the policy level, operationalised in practice through 
person-centred approaches (Brown, Hatton & Emerson, 2013; Care Act, 2014; Petry, Maes & 
Vlaskamp 2005; Schalock et al, 2002; Valuing People, 2001; Valuing People Now, 2009).  
One recent approach has been to examine physiological measures of affect in people with 
profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMD) (Vos et al, 2012; Vos, De Cock, Petry, 
Van Den Noortgate, & Maes, 2010, 2013). The physiological approach sits comfortably 
alongside research adopting an observational approach to the study of social interaction, 
particularly that concerned with affective communication (Hogg, Reeves, Roberts & 
Mudford, 2001; Hostyn & Maes, 2009; Petry & Maes, 2006). Across these approaches, the 
emphasis has fallen on the development of methods for determining the emotional 
experiences of people with SPID. These extend to measures of the respiratory, cardiovascular 
and electro-dermal systems (Vos et al, 2010), proxy (observer) evaluations of positive or 
negative emotional responses (Hogg et al., 2001) and the combination and correlation of the 
two (Vos et al., 2013). 
Though these techniques have made useful contributions to our understanding of the 
emotional lives of people with SPID, they are affected by a number of methodological issues 
including: the reliance on proxy evaluations of the valence (positive or negative) of elicited 
responses (Hogg et al, 2001; Vos et al, 2013); the heterogeneity of the target population, in 
terms of idiosyncratic affective responses (Blain-Moraes & Chau, 2012; Vos et al, 2013); and 
a reliance on quasi-naturalistic interactions as data, in both physiological (e.g., Vos et al, 
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2010) and observational studies (e.g., Hostyn, Daelman, Janssen & Maes, 2010; Hostyn, 
Petry, Lambrechts & Maes 2011). Both the above approaches can be described as adopting a 
primarily intra-individual perspective on emotion, i.e., they are primarily concerned with 
emotions as phenomena located within the individual, which reduces dynamic emotional 
events to measures of physiological or behavioural responses. Consequently, these 
approaches have little to say about how the emotional experiences and expressions of people 
with SPID are located within everyday situations and activities, and in interactions with 
others, be they parents, family members, paid carers or others with SPID.  
These limitations have not gone unnoticed by those researchers. Vos et al (2013) concede 
that the use of physiological measures of emotional experience would be unrealistic in daily 
practice and add little value over and above behavioural observation. Hostyn and Maes 
(2009) recognised that emotions are only partly a personal condition and that there is a need 
to recognise how emotions arise in interaction through the participation of both partners. 
They later made the case for observational research that focussed on “the person with PIMD, 
the direct support staff, as well as the interacting dyad” and which valued the “experiential 
knowledge of the interaction partner” (Hostyn and Maes, 2013; p.190). Such observations are 
consistent with a more socio-dynamic approach to emotions, where emotions are situated, 
their meaning and function determined, between, rather than within, individuals (Mesquita & 
Boiger, 2014).  
If the study of emotions in people with SPID is to make a meaningful contribution to the 
translation of policy into personalized practice, then it must engage with emotions as they 
arise in everyday life, in response to everyday objects and interactional partners, and located 
within the routines and practices of social and health care services. Such an aim requires that 
emotions for people with SPID are treated as located in situational contexts, in the course of 
interactions with others and as arising in response to prior action or stimulus, and that they 
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are recognised as key resources through which preferences are made known and rights are 
exercised in the pursuit of those preferences.  The growing literature on emotion in 
interaction as examined through Conversation Analysis (CA) (see Peräkylä & Sorjonen, 
2012) provides a technical framework and lexicon for examining emotion as an integral 
feature of everyday social actions. Within CA, emotion is examined under the concept of 
affective stance, understood as the embodied and socially available “mood, attitude, feeling 
and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern” 
(Ochs, 1996, p. 410). The affective stance comprises non-verbal and verbal components, e.g., 
the facial displays, vocalisations or utterances of a person with SPID, and is analysed in 
context. The analysis focuses both on how the affective stance is displayed (through prosody, 
facial expression, etc.), how any audience responds to it, i.e., how it is treated as an 
expression of one type of emotion or another, and how it is made relevant to an unfolding 
sequence of activity, e.g., from simply “hanging out” in a social care setting to exercising 
choice and control. In so doing, the CA approach provides for the examination of emotion as 
an organised form of situated social practice (Couper-Kuhlen, 2009; Goodwin, Cekaite & 
Goodwin, 2012).  
Previous CA research has examined explicit verbal identification of an affective stance as 
a feature of interactions occurring in institutional settings, rather than in more informal 
everyday interactions. For example, in Voutilainen’s (2012) analysis of psychotherapy 
sessions and in Hepburn and Potter’s (2012) analysis of calls to a helpline, the 
psychotherapists and call takers are shown to explicitly identify the affective stance of the 
client or caller. By doing this, the affective stance is made relevant to the topic of talk, i.e., 
the issue under discussion in therapy or the reason for the call to the helpline, and so becomes 
part of the problem to be addressed. In social care services for people with SPID, and 
particularly in the UK where there is an institutional imperative to provide person-centred 
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support (Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014), support 
staff ought to be concerned with recognising, interpreting and responding to affective stances, 
as communicating evaluative responses and/or expressions of personal preference, in order to 
provide support that is tailored to the individual’s personal preferences, needs, wishes and 
choices.   
The following analysis represents an initial, exploratory attempt to examine how affective 
stances adopted by people with SPID are recognised and engaged with by support staff, and, 
thereby, to advance CA as a method by which we might arrive at a context-sensitive 
understanding of the role played by emotion in shaping the lives and experiences of people 
with SPID in social care settings. In so doing, the analysis will answer the following research 
questions: 1) What behaviours are treated as constituting the affective stances of people with 
SPID? 2) How are affective stances acted upon in the course of social care provision? 3)What 
are the implications of such actions for the negotiation of rights and authority between people 
with SPID and those who work with them? 
Method 
Data 
The excerpts presented below are taken from a corpus of naturalistic video recordings of 
social interactions in social care services located within an NHS Care Trust in the south of 
England. The service, “Ashgrove”, was home to ten adults; the parents of one resident 
insisted that he not be involved in the research project in any way. Of the nine residents for 
whom consent was gained to participate in the project, there were 6 men and 3 women, they 
ranged in age from 33 to 52 years (M = 41.2 years, SD = 6.4 years) and all had severe or 
profound intellectual disabilities. No formal assessments of communicative ability were 
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conducted, however, based on residents’ files and 9-months of ethnographic observations, 
researchers observed that residents had few intelligible words, phrases or signs. 
On each shift three members of staff supported the residents. The staff team was highly 
changeable, and comprised of permanent and agency staff, of whom, 9 consented to 
participate in the study. The names of all residents and members of staff have been replaced 
with pseudonyms and any other potentially identifying information has been changed. The 
study and its procedures were reviewed and approved by a UK NHS Research Ethics 
Committee (REF: 05/Q2501/83). 
Procedure 
The video recordings, the data on which the following analysis is based, were made 
primarily to support examination of the practices through which staff promoted choice and 
independence in the service and were made only in the public parts of the service (the dining 
room, living room, kitchen, hallway and garden). The residents were highly reliant on 
members of staff to have their basic physical needs met and to have their, often idiosyncratic, 
signs, gestures and vocalisations interpreted. Consequently, the strategy for recording 
interactions was simply for the first author (and the video camera) to be with the residents 
when they were in the public areas of the service and to record interactions between residents 
and members of the support staff as and when they arose, consent allowing. This yielded a 
corpus of approx. 10 hours of video recordings.  
This corpus was screened by the first author for occasions where staff verbally oriented to 
the behaviour (gestural, postural, facial expression or vocalization) of a resident with SPID as 
reflecting an affective state (or, in the terms of this analysis, as constituting an affective 
stance). Given that discrete emotion terms are rarely used, this search was purposefully 
inclusive and admitted instances that rely on an appreciation of British colloquialisms. For 
example, the enquiry “why are you looking at me like that?” provides the basis for inclusion 
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because the identified “look” is treated as having some underlying, possibly affective, 
meaning. This search yielded only 14 such instances across the entire corpus and these 
orientations to affect will be the focus of the following analysis.  
The sampling strategy has two immediate and obvious consequences. It does not admit 
instances when facial expressions, non-verbal behaviours and vocalisations, which could 
have reflected an affective state, were exhibited by residents but elicited no response. Nor 
does it admit instances where the affective stance is oriented to non-verbally by a member of 
staff, e.g., by returning a smile, as promoted within Intensive Interaction (Nind & Hewitt, 
1994). The exclusion of these instances does not negate their potential interest to researchers 
nor their importance in interactions involving people with SPID. They are excluded here 
because they provide no basis for an analysis of how staff verbally respond to the behaviour 
of people with SPID as constituting an affective stance and consequently, individually or 
collectively, pursue the causes and/or motivations of those affective stances. That is to say, 
the following analysis is concerned only with those occasions when an affective stance on the 
part of a person with SPID is explicitly recognised and verbally responded to as the basis for 
some further action by members of staff. It is only on occasions such as these that we can see 
how the subjective emotional states of people with SPID are incorporated into, or resisted in 
the course of, the everyday provision of person-centred services.  
Results 
Analytic Method 
These data were analysed through the use of Conversation Analysis (CA) with attention 
being given to the multi-modal nature of interactions (e.g., Goodwin, 1984; Mondada, 2009; 
Author ref). This method allows close examination of all features of an interaction, e.g., 
gesture, facial expression, gaze direction, vocalisations and talk, and their sequential 
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organisation. This approach is well-suited to the analysis of interactions involving people 
with SPID because it allows examination of all the modalities through which individuals may 
communicate or be treated as communicating. The aim of CA is to explicate the resources 
and practices through which participants in an interaction display their understanding of what 
they and their interactional partners are saying and thereby doing (Sacks, 1992). In the below 
analysis, we are specifically concerned with identifying the practices through which 
behaviours, including facial expressions, gestures and vocalisations, are oriented to as 
constituting an affective stance, how their valence and/or intensity is made relevant, how the 
eliciting stimuli are identified and how an appropriate next course of action is determined. 
Given the small data set, each excerpt was analysed individually and the following groupings 
were identified.  
The analysis allowed the 14 instances to be grouped into three types. The first is where 
affect is noticed and oriented to as unconnected to any other activity, with the consequence 
that the affect is momentarily made the topic of conversation. The second type includes 
instances where the cause of the affect is immediate and obvious within the local context, 
providing the basis for consequential actions, including the generation of socially shared 
knowledge about the individual in question. The third type may be seen as a sub-set of the 
second, but is distinguished by the actions of the member of staff being the putative cause of 
the affective stance. Each of these types of orientations to affect will be evidenced, analysed 
and discussed in turn. 
Noticing affect 
Excerpts 1-3 include examples of support staff simply orienting to the affective stance of a 
person with SPID. In all three instances the orientation to the affective stance arises apropos 
of nothing, except for the “look” or vocalisation from the person with SPID. Prior to the turns 
shown in Excerpt 1, the residents (Damien and Matthew) are seated next to each other on the 
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sofa while music plays loudly; only Sandy, one of the support workers, and Chris, the 
researcher, are present and neither is interacting with any of the residents. The camera is 
focussed on Damien and Matthew, with Sandy out of shot to their right. At line 1 Damien’s 
head and gaze are oriented towards Sandy and that gaze is held for 1.86 seconds. Given the 
shadows across his face it is unclear whether Damien is smiling, though his lips are clearly 
parted. 
Excerpt 1 (Ashgrove22*) 
1    Damien:    ((sat back on sofa, his head is oriented to the right towards Sandy;  
2               his face is in shadow but his lips are clearly parted)) 
3     Sandy:     [hu hu (.5) why're you looking at(h) m(h)e like th(h)at? 
4    Damien:    [((head moves to left; gaze is away from Sandy)) 
5    Damien:    ((head swings back to right then back to centre; left hand raised  
6               and then bounced on sofa arm; he is clearly smiling)) 
7    Chris:      a hu hu hu [hu 
8    Damien:              [((swings head from centre to right and back to centre,  
9               with a nod on the return to centre; smiling throughout)) 
10   Damien:    ((moves head/gaze back to right and back to centre, again with a nod,  
11              before coming to rest looking to right, i.e. at Sandy; smiling throughout)) 
12   Sandy:     awww Damien 
*All recordings in the data set are labelled to indicate the site in which they were collected 
and the number of the recording, hence excerpt 1 is a segment from the 22nd recording made 
at “Ashgrove”. 
 
Sandy effectively treats Damien’s gaze and facial expression as an initiation, and her 
utterance at line 3 is timed just as Damien breaks off the gaze and begins to move his head 
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and gaze back to centre. The turn begins with two laughter particles, marking something 
about Damien’s facial expression as humorous and/or having a positive valence. Either 
Damien’s facial expression and affective stance are positive, in which case Sandy’s laughter 
is reciprocal, or they are negative, in which case Sandy’s laughter constitutes a 
complementary response. Considering that the orientation to the facial expression is phrased 
as an interrogative – “why’re you looking at me like that?” – which may be heard as 
accusatory and challenging, the latter possibility seems the more likely. The phrase “like 
that” implies that the look conveys some meaning. However, the laughter particles that 
intersperse it may mark the question as being asked ironically; it is a mock reprimand, a joke 
about the apparently negative affective stance and whatever might underlie it, e.g., an 
evaluation of Sandy. This interpretation is supported by Damien’s response in lines 5&6; he 
begins clearly to smile and bounce his hand on the arm of the sofa. Chris’s laughter in line 7 
functions as a receipt of this more obviously positive affective stance. The interaction ends 
with Damien gazing towards Sandy whilst clearly smiling. This elicits the change of state 
response token (Heritage, 1984) - “awww Damien” (line 12) - marking Sandy’s own 
affective stance towards Damien as either a source of disappointment or pity, or as cute or 
endearing (Palacio & Gustilo, 2016). Given the generally positive valence of the preceding 
turns, the latter interpretation seems the more likely.  
To summarise excerpt 1, a member of staff orients, verbally and prosodically, to the 
apparent affective stance, made up of facial expressions and non-verbal behaviours, of a 
person with SPID before a third-party audience. Sandy makes Damien’s apparent affective 
stance towards her the topic of conversation, but does not pursue this topic beyond her initial 
interrogative in line 3. In Goffman’s (1974/1986) terms, and based on Sandy’s orientation to 
his affective stance, Damien is clearly “in frame” and has full “participation status”; the 
interrogative recognises his authority over and knowledge of his affective stance. However, 
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Damien cannot respond verbally to Sandy’s question and he cannot make explicit what 
underlies his affective stance. Following Roberts (2004), the interrogative at line 3 may also 
be interpreted as designed for Chris (as a co-present third party), as much as for Damien, to 
publicly mark Damien’s affective stance and invite joint discussion of it. Within this 
interpretation, Damien may also therefore be considered “out of frame”; as someone who can 
be talked about even when co-present. This dual status of people with SPID, as both in and 
out of frame, is a recurring feature of orientations to affect and of the wider dataset. 
The interaction presented in excerpt 2 follows approximately 94 seconds after that in 
excerpt 1. Music still plays loudly in the background, Matthew and Damien are still seated on 
the sofa and Sandy and Chris are not interacting with them but are talking to each other.  
Excerpt 2 (Ashgrove22) 
1    Matthew:    ((hands clasped at chin height, head movement from left to right  
2                directs gaze upwards towards Sandy, clearly not smiling)) 
3    Sandy:      do(h)n't look at me like that 
4    Matthew:    ((head movement back to centre, eyes close and head drops))  
5    Sandy:      hu huh 
6    Chris:       ahu huh 
7    Sandy:      hu hu 
 
Excerpt 2 displays many properties similar to those of excerpt 1: a person with SPID 
clearly orients their head, gaze and facial expression towards a member of staff; this is treated 
as an initiation; and is responded to in a way that has some accusatory force, though this may 
be done humorously (note the laughter particle in “do(h)n’t” (line 3)). However, the directive 
response clearly does not provide the same basis for development as did the interrogative in 
excerpt 1. Again, the phrase “like that” implies that the facial expression potentially conveys 
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an affective stance and underlying that some evaluation of its object. Given that Matthew 
cannot verbally respond to the directive, i.e., he cannot verbally explain what underlies his 
“look” and he cannot challenge Sandy’s assumed right to issue directives (even if issued 
jokingly), he does one of the only things he can do. He physically acquiesces by changing his 
bodily orientation, returning his head to centre, dropping his chin and closing his eyes. Again, 
the consequent laughter from Sandy and Chris at this response marks the exchange as 
humorous, retrospectively softening the original directive.  
The first two excerpts deal with orientations to facial expressions where the phrase “like 
that” potentially indexes some affective stance and underlying evaluation. Though they differ 
in the form of response, interrogative vs. directive, both responses treat the “look” as in some 
way problematic, even if for humorous effect. The inability of the individuals with SPID to 
respond verbally to either an interrogative or directive means that whatever might underlie 
their “look” is never established. 
These sequences may be regarded as malfunctioning forms of a type identified by 
Schegloff (1992) where third position repair provides the basis for intersubjectivity among 
communicatively able individuals. In these excerpts the “look” of the person with SPID is 
treated as an initiation and so occupies the turn 1 position (T1). The response from the 
member of staff in the turn 2 position (T2) treats the T1 “look” as problematic, as the source 
of some interactional trouble. In Schegloff’s analysis, and normatively, the first speaker 
would then produce a turn in the third position (T3) that addresses the trouble with T1, 
thereby providing for intersubjectivity; a shared understanding of social reality and the 
speakers’ respective positions within it. In these excerpts, the inability of the person with 
SPID to provide a verbal response at T3 that would repair the problem with T1 means that 
intersubjectivity, about the nature of their look and its possible meaning, is not achieved. The 
inevitability of this outcome – based on her experience with these residents Sandy cannot 
Orienting to affect 
 
realistically expect them to produce a repair in the T3 position – is likely the source of the 
ironic stance, marked prosodically by the laughter tokens, of Sandy’s T2 responses.  
Excerpt 3 (Ashgrove44) 
1     Dev:     going on Monday ehh eh he ha(h)a:::w::: 
2     Chris:    h huh he [hu 
3     Jill:              [ah ha  [h a:::::r  (.85) what's so funny? 
4     Dev:                   [(knock him down) 
5              (.64) 
6     Dev:     (one fun a fen on [there)                      
7     Jill:                     [what's funny? (1.3) huh? 
8     Dev:     (oh god I give up) 
9     Jill:      say 'where's that sun gone' (.7) where's it gone Dev? 
 
The same sequence is clearly repeated in excerpt 3, this time involving a more verbally 
able resident, Dev. From general observations, while some of Dev’s utterances are intelligible 
others are not, and few are obviously designed for a recipient. Prior to the interaction in 
excerpt 3, Dev was talking aloud to himself while seated in the garden with other residents. 
The laughter at the end of turn 1, though not obviously addressed to either Chris or Jill and 
not, therefore, obviously an initiation, is sufficient to elicit reciprocal responses from both, 
with Jill’s laughter being followed by the interrogative “what’s so funny?” (line 3). As above, 
an initial affective stance (T1) is receipted with a interrogative (T2) regarding the cause of 
that affect. The T2 response and its contracted repetition at line 7 fail to elicit a T3 repair, and 
Jill abandons pursuit of an answer at line 9. Again, the cause of a potential affective stance 
remains undetermined. 
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Such sequences neatly encapsulate a key problem for staff in services. Potential affective 
stances of people with SPID are often clearly visible, though the particular affect displayed 
may be ambiguous.  In the absence of an obvious eliciting stimulus, effort and interaction are 
required to uncover it. Typically, this is pursued by promoting the person with SPID adopting 
an epistemic stance in relation to their affective stance, i.e., the individual making socially 
available their knowledge of what underlies their affect. Pursuit of such knowledge provides 
the basis for intersubjectivity. The social accountability of affect and its potential to provide 
for intersubjectivity are sufficient for staff to pursue repair and clarification. However, staff 
pursue repair from individuals who they know lack the verbal skills to provide it and this, 
therefore, requires further explanation. Three possible interpretations arise: one is that staff 
do this because there is an institutional agenda to identify individuals’ preferences, indeed 
anything that might underlie their affective stances, in the provision of person-centred care; a 
second is that they are simply doing what is normative in the pursuit of intersubjectivity, (i.e., 
staff do this because to do so is to be, and to demonstrably treat others as, social human 
beings); a third is that, even if pursuit of repair is a normative practice and even if no such 
repair might reasonably be expected, pursuing it has the additional benefit of creating a slot 
(T3) within which the person with SPID can make a contribution of some kind and thereby 
continue the interaction; note that both Damien and Matthew do something in that third 
position.  
Affect as a response to some local stimulus 
Of the three types of orientations to affect, this second type is the simplest in that the 
affective stance is clearly a response to a local stimulus. Consequently, there is no trouble, 
such as identifying a cause (as in excerpts 1-3), to be resolved. Excerpts 4 and 5 establish that 
members of staff orient to the affective stances of people with SPID, with immediate 
consequences for their status as interactional partners. Prior to the sequence contained in 
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excerpt 4, the residents, the researcher and one member of staff, Sandy, were in the lounge 
listening to music.  
Excerpt 4 (Ashgrove20) 
1    Damien:     ((lifts head, gaze directed towards Chris, slight smile)) 
2    Chris:       [you're on camera Day 
3    Damien:     [((smiling, head moves to right and back to centre, gaze directed at  
4                Chris and camera)) 
5    Damien:     ((smiles more broadly, makes more extensive head movements, first  
6                to his right, swings back to his left (his whole upper body moves)  
7                and [back to centre)) 
8    Sandy:          [aw::: ↑he like it [he like the (inaudible) (0.8) you like the  
9                song? 
10   Damien:                        [((gaze directed towards Sandy, head held  
11               still))  
 
Damien’s facial expression and his extensive and energetic bodily movement at lines 5-7 
are clearly treated by Sandy as constituting a positive affective stance on the song that is 
playing. The change of state token “aw:::” followed by the declarative “he like the”, and the 
interrogative “you like this song?” (line 8), mark Sandy’s transition from a state of not 
knowing Damien’s (apparent) liking for The Weather Girls’ “It’s Raining Men” to having 
that knowledge and seeking confirmation of it. Damien is, however, unable to speak, though 
he can indicate agreement non-verbally with a nod. The declarative is clearly not designed for 
Damien (it is for Chris), but the interrogative clearly is designed for Damien. Again, 
Damien’s participation status is variable; he is both in and out of frame, available to be 
addressed and simultaneously dissattendable.  
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Similar actions are repeated in excerpt 5 where the residents were seated in the picnic area 
of a local park. Steven had been given the mobile phone of one of the members of staff, 
Juliana, on which to listen to music.  
 
Excerpt 5 (Ashgrove26) 
1    Steven:    ((listening to music on a mobile phone he is holding to his left  
2              ear with his left hand)) 
3    Steven:    [((moves mobile from his ear and places it on the table in front  
4              of him)) 
5    Steven:    [well done (.2) 
6    Juliana:    well do:ne: (.9) 
7    Steven:    [well done (.2) 
8    Steven:    [((smiles and [claps hands before clasping them at chest height)) 
9    Juliana:                [we:ll do::ne: was that go:od (.3) 
10   Chris:                 [well done Steven 
11   Steven:    (play) two 
12             (1.1) 
13   Juliana:    listen to the music↑ (.3) 
14   Steven:    ((begins to smile; head movements from side-to-side; hands  
15             clasped under chin)) 
16   Steven:    de de de [dee                
17   Juliana:            [o:h lovely::= 
18   Steven:    =lovely 
19             [(4.8) 
20   Steven:    [((smiling broadly, head movements from side-to-side; hands  
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21             clasped under chin)) 
22   Juliana:    >oh that's a< lovely smi:le↑ 
 
In line 5, Steven announces the end of the song to which he was listening with the 
assessment “well done”; the movement of the phone away from his ear, presumably at the 
end of the song, begins before the utterance. That this announcement is phrased as an 
assessment provides for the repeated, with emphasis, “well do:ne:” of Juliana in line 6. This 
assessment, unlike Steven’s original, takes Steven as its object; it is he who is identified and 
celebrated, through Juliana’s positive prosody and affective stance, as having done well. This 
apparent praise and affective stance is receipted and echoed by Steven both verbally and non-
verbally (lines 7 & 8), occasioning a further repeat from Juliana, with further emphasis and 
heightened prosody (line 9). It is now Steven’s affective stance that is being celebrated, a 
stance for which the cause is subsequently made explicit. Juliana’s interrogative “was that 
go:od” nominates the music to which Steven had been listening as the candidate cause of 
his positive affective stance. The design of Sandy’s and Juliana’s interrogatives in excerpts 4 
and 5 respectively, including candidate causes and requiring only confirmation, constitute a 
shallow knowledge gradient between them and the people with SPID with whom they are 
interacting (Heritage, 2012). Both Damien (in excerpt 4) and Steven (in excerpt 5) are 
credited with knowing more about their affective stances than do Sandy and Juliana, though 
they (Sandy and Juliana) reasonably claim some knowledge of their possible causes (evident 
through the candidate causes in their interrogatives) based on their co-location within the 
immediate situational context; in non-CA terms, while both Sandy and Juliana have an idea 
as to their causes they demonstrably recognise Damien and Steven’s privileged status on the 
matter of the causes of their affective stances. 
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It should be noted that the interaction continues with Juliana making two further 
orientations to Steven’s positive affective stance at lines 17 and 22. Both take the form of a 
change of state token “oh”, followed by a positive assessment of Steven’s verbal or non-
verbal behaviour (his singing and his smile), and both have positive prosody with heightened 
emphasis and pitch. It would be entirely reasonable to interpret these turns as designed for 
Steven; they are responses to and celebrate some action by him, but they do not require a 
response from him, they are complete and project no next turn. It would also be reasonable to 
suggest that the turns are simultaneously designed, in the manner of a commentary, for the 
other staff members, researcher and video camera that are co-present. In that view, Steven is 
assigned the same dual participation status as evident above; as in-frame and having full 
participation in one turn, out of frame and disattendable in the next (Goffman, 1974/1986).  
Staff orientations to the affective stances of people with SPID, in situations where the 
cause is relatively obvious and there is consequently a shallow knowledge gradient between 
the respective parties, are designed in ways that respect the authority of the individual on the 
cause of their affective stance and afford them the opportunity to assert that authority. That 
the adults with SPID in question possess limited capacity to make such a response - a fact of 
which the staff are aware - does provide for the alternative interpretation that these utterances 
are, at least in part, also designed for the benefit of the non-ID individuals co-present. By 
treating the person with SPID as out of frame and able to be talked about even when co-
present, staff generate socially shared knowledge about that individual, her or his likes and 
dislikes. Both interpretations describe staff orientations to affect that are, in terms of their 
functions and consequences, valid, even desirable, features of the provision of person-centred 
social care.  
The final section will examine orientations to negative affective stances, and their 
consequences in terms of determining next actions, in interactions where that stance is 
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sequentially located as a response to an action by a member of staff. Following Stevanovic 
(2011), deontic status is used to refer to the position of authority that an individual occupies 
relative to others within a local order. In these data, it concerns the respective authority of 
members of staff and people with SPID, made apparent through adopting a deontic stance, to 
determine what happens next, for example, the authority of a member of staff to deny a 
resident access to a particular room or object.  
Orienting to affective responses to staff action 
In the final three excerpts, members of staff orient to the affective stances of people with 
SPID where the candidate cause of that affect is a proximal action by the staff member. In 
these three examples the affective stance is negatively valenced and treated as some form of 
complaint about the initiating action. Excerpt 6 begins on a sunny day with Matthew lying 
face down on the lawn in the back garden of the home. His sleeveless shirt and shorts require 
Sandy to apply sun cream to his exposed arms and legs.  
Excerpt 6 (Ashgrove37) 
1    S:    ((Approaches from out of shot, kneels beside Matthew)) 
2    S:    I know you are gonna lie down there he doesn't care 
3         if he has sunburn or not 
4    S:    ((applies sun cream to Matthew's left leg and foot)) 
5    M:   nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn (low vocalization lasting 3 secs) 
6    M:   ((slight head turn to his left (towards Sandy) and then back  
7         to centre)) 
8    S:    what? 
9         (2.5) 
10   S:    y' [want me to stop (4.0)  hmm (.6)(oh god)(.5) Janet's there 
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11   S:      [((applies sun cream to Matthew's left arm and hand))     
 
The sequence begins in lines 2 and 3 with a turn that establishes Matthew’s dual status. 
From the outset, he is, like the residents in the preceding excerpts, simultaneously in and out 
of frame. This turn both announces and accounts for, to Matthew and Chris respectively, 
Sandy’s imminent action. In what follows, and in greater detail, Matthew’s vocalisation in 
line 5 is oriented to as a negatively valenced affective, and thereby potentially evaluative, 
stance on Sandy’s action. As in the above examples, there is a shallow knowledge gradient in 
this interaction; there is little ambiguity as to what Matthew’s vocalisation is a response. The 
second interrogative in line 10 repairs the ambiguity of the first  - “what?” in line 8; the 
trouble is not with identifying the cause of Matthew’s affective stance, so much as 
determining an appropriate next action. By treating the vocalisation as an affective stance that 
serves some communicative function, Sandy also treats Matthew as having the requisite 
deontic status (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012; 2014)  to determine the next action, i.e., the 
continuation or cessation of the application of sun cream. That Sandy continues to apply sun 
cream in the absence of a response from Matthew has two possible interpretations. Either the 
lack of a repeated vocalisation, and the absence of any other response, is treated as Matthew 
assenting to the continued application of the sun cream. Alternatively, Matthew is again 
treated as having dual status and Sandy’s utterance at line 10 is designed for Chris, to mark 
recognition of Matthew’s affective stance rather than any deontic stance. He is 
simultaneously in frame, with full affective and deontic status, able to take an evaluative 
stance on and exercise authority over actions performed upon him by others, and out of 
frame, with reduced participation status, wherein his affective stance and any simultaneous 
deontic stance may be acknowledged for the benefit of a third party, but ultimately 
overridden by a staff member exercising their duty of care. 
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Excerpt 7 (Ashgrove38) 
1    Sandy:   ((rubs sun cream onto D's left arm)) 
2    Steven:   ((claps [once still smiling)) 
3    Sandy:         [it's eno [ugh 
4    Sandy:                [((tries to apply sun cream to Steven’s moving right 
5             arm)) 
6    Steven:   ((left hand raised to mouth and bitten, [tries to wrestle right arm  
7             free from Sandy, whole body wriggles)) 
8    Steven:                                    [UUURRUUUGF ((loud  
9             vocalisation)) (.2) 
10   Sandy:   (okay) 
11   Sandy:   ((releases D's right arm, retrieves bottle and moves backward out  
12            of shot)) 
13   Steven:   ((bite relaxed, left hand drops from mouth, claps gently, looks  
14            after Sandy smiling broadly)) 
15   Sandy:   y' don't need to shout (1.5) just tell m(h)e (h)it's e(h)nough (.4) 
16            hu hu 
17   Steven:   ((smile fades, hands clasped to chin and lower left cheek, sits  
18                still)) 
 
The interaction contained in excerpt 7 is much like that in excerpt 6. A resident, this time 
Steven, is seated in the garden on a sunny day with exposed arms and legs. A member of 
staff, again Sandy, begins to apply sun cream. It should be noted that Sandy’s utterance at 
line 3 – “it’s enough” – is interpretable as signalling the end of the activity, i.e., that sufficient 
sun cream has been applied. That she continues to apply sun cream following this 
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announcement provides one candidate explanation for Steven’s change of state from passive, 
apparently happy, recipient, to active resistance. In lines 6-8 Steven adopts an affective 
stance through both gestural and vocal modalities. He brings his left hand to his mouth and 
bites it, whilst also trying to wrest his right arm from Sandy. Overlapping this, Steven issues 
a loud and intense vocalisation.  
Taken together, and as will be seen again in excerpt 8, staff routinely treat these actions as 
constituting a negative affective stance. This affective stance is acknowledged through 
Sandy’s consequential change of activity token (Gardner, 2001) – “okay” (line 10) – and is 
treated as a complaint about the application of sun cream (lines 11-12). By responding to 
Steven’s vocalisation in this way, Sandy effectively recognises both Steven’s affective stance 
(constituted by the intense and loud vocalisation) and his deontic status as one who has the 
right to determine what actions others can perform upon him. Having done all this, Sandy 
then proceeds in line 15-16 to issue her own complaint, albeit in joking tones, about the 
manner in which Steven issued his complaint and exercised his authority, i.e., the complaint 
was legitimate but the manner of his affective stance was disproportionate – “y' don't need to 
shout” (line 15). Even in this teasing rejoinder Sandy recognises Steven’s right to determine 
what happens to him. 
Excerpt 8 shares many similarities with excerpts 6 and 7. A resident, again Steven, adopts 
an affective stance, through a loud and intense vocalisation, in response to an action initiated 
by a member of staff. The excerpt begins with Melissa guiding Steven into the living room of 
the house, Steven having just been to the toilet.  
Excerpt 8 (Ashgrove18) 
1    Melissa:   would you like a- what d' you want? 
2    Steven:    ((moves his hands down Melissa’s arm to her right hand)) 
3    Steven:    [°in (toilet)° 
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4    Steven:    [((turns to his left, turning Melissa as he does so, both now face back  
5              the way they came but Steven does not move towards the door)) 
6    Melissa:   okay we'll go this way then (.4) where d' you wanna go? (.9) 
7    Melissa:   [((Melissa moves in front of Steven and brings her face close to his)) 
8    Melissa:   [where do you want to go? (.) 
9    Steven:    MMMMMEE[RR ((loud vocalization)) 
10   Melissa:   >no listen Steven< you can't go back in the toilet you've just been to  
11             the toi [let 
12   Steven:          [MMMMMEERR (loud vocalization) 
13   Melissa:   would you like to go in y' room and listen to music? 
14   Steven:    ((sways from side to side, may be smiling)) 
15   Melissa:   YEah come on then 
 
From the outset, Melissa is concerned with identifying some activity or location that will 
be agreeable to Steven. It is important to note that, in response to Melissa’s repaired open 
question at line 1, Steven unambiguously states his preference to return to the toilet (line 3). 
Though clearly audible, Steven’s choice is not acknowledged. From the video recording, 
Melissa’s change of activity response token in line 6 is best understood as a response to 
Steven’s movement rather than his utterance. Melissa’s repeated interrogatives in lines 6 and 
8 do not demonstrate any orientation to Steven’s expressed choice, except implicitly to treat it 
as invalid. These repeated interrogatives, and the apparent rejection of his clearly stated 
preferred next activity/location, elicit the first of two loud vocalisations from Steven (line 9), 
clearly constituting and responded to as an affective stance.  
The vocalisation is well-timed as a response to the second interrogative and well-placed as 
a complaint at his initial choice having been repeatedly ignored. The interpretation of Steven 
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having being heard but his response ignored or discounted, and that this constitutes legitimate 
grounds for complaint, is supported by Melissa’s response at lines 10 and 11. The turn can be 
broken down into three parts. This first is a call for Steven’s attention. This is issued with 
increased rate of speech, clearly mirroring the affective urgency of the vocalisation, but also 
problematising the complaint as based on lack of attention and/or understanding. Steven’s 
affective stance is therefore recognised but treated as invalid on epistemic grounds. The 
importance of epistemic matters – what Steven may or may not know - is evident in the two 
remaining parts of Melissa’s turn, the first of which is an explicit rejection of Steven’s prior, 
and now evidently heard, choice – “you can't go back in the toilet” (line 10). This is justified 
by the third and final part, an appeal to their equal epistemic status – “you’ve just been to the 
toilet” (lines 10-11). Steven’s loud vocalisations are clearly treated as constituting affective 
stances, through which he issues complaints and attempts to determine next actions. He is 
treated as having the deontic status necessary to do that, except on this occasion where his 
epistemic status, underlying both his affective and deontic stances, is called into question, 
(i.e., he is treated as not knowing that one does not immediately return to the toilet having 
just been).   
In the final three excerpts it is the role that affective stances play in shaping next actions, 
the central importance of epistemic and deontic stances and statuses in determining how 
affective stances are treated, and the fact that speakers (here the staff) explicitly orient to 
these issues when determining and negotiating next actions with people with SPID that are 
worthy of note. Staff, at least in the excerpts presented here, demonstrably treat their 
interactional partners with SPID as possessing the necessary cognitive capabilities to adopt a 
range of affective, epistemic and deontic stances in interaction and as having the requisite 
statuses, with the occasional exception of epistemic status, to do those things. Finally, it is 
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worth mentioning that in all cases it is the authority of the resident that ultimately wins out, 
no more sun cream is applied and Steven eventually returns to the toilet. 
 Discussion 
Hostyn and Maes (2009) called for an examination of the emotions of people with 
intellectual disabilities that recognised the emotional component “as mutually created in the 
interaction through the participation of both partners” (p.309). This analysis, the first multi-
modal CA-based analysis of naturalistic sequences of interaction involving displays of affect 
by people with SPID, represents a preliminary attempt to answer that call and, in doing so, 
establishes a number of key issues. First, such displays are participants’ concerns, for both 
people with SPID and those who support them, and are, for both parties, multi-modal 
phenomena, incorporating facial expressions, gestures, vocalisations, prosody, etc. Secondly, 
displays of affect by people with SPID require an attentive and motivated interactional 
partner if they are to be recognised as such, their object and/or function determined, and if 
they are to constitute an effective resource by which the preferences, needs and wishes of the 
individual are to be made public, acted upon and entered into experiential and institutional 
knowledge. Thirdly, these displays are, however, potentially challenging when they are 
displays of negative affect, particularly so when they occur in response to actions by support 
staff. On such occasions, displays of affect may challenge the social structures and power 
relations operating within social care services, and are, therefore, a precarious resource, i.e., 
they might not always be recognised, might not be explored and/or might be subordinated in 
pursuit of some institutional agenda or personal preference of their interactional partner.  
The analysis also demonstrates the potential limitations and implications of the strategies 
that staff adopt when verbally orienting to affect. Adoption of the verbal modality has 
consequent implications for the continued participation of people with SPID. Support staff 
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often respond in ways that ascribe to people with SPID dual participation status; they can be 
spoken to and about to others, as if they were not there, within the same utterance. In defence 
of the members of staff, it should be remembered that they do these things for a variety of 
reasons. The practices they adopt when orienting to affect are entirely normative. They 
pursue intersubjectivity despite past experience of the limited utility of such efforts. They 
individually and collectively generate shared understandings of the preferences of people 
with SPID, and in these excerpts, they were, ultimately, respectful of individuals’ right to 
self-determination, albeit within the constraints of social care provision.  
The above observations may seem obvious or common sense. Indeed, explicating the 
interactional mechanisms on which mundane practices and common-sense understandings 
rely is the business of CA. But, by making such mechanisms and their normative functions 
explicit, CA also reveals the potential implications of their absence. It is sobering to imagine 
the consequences if staff in services, in response to displays of affect, did not to pursue 
intersubjectivity, if they did not ascribe to residents cognitive abilities at least equal to their 
own, or if they did not interactionally recognise the rights of people with severe or profound 
intellectual disabilities to express preferences and exercise self-determination. Failure to do 
such things would amount to the denial of basic humanity.  
By identifying the above issues, the analysis highlights the potential value of adopting a 
socio-dynamic approach to emotions and the value of applying multi-modal CA to the 
examination of naturalistic data. There are admittedly limitations to the above analysis. The 
data set is small, but naturalistic recordings of interactions in social care services are ethically 
and practically challenging data to collect and, as can be seen here, orientations to affect 
occur infrequently. The sampling strategy of examining only verbal orientations to affect 
imposes another limitation on the analysis, but examination of non-verbal orientations to 
affect, their trajectories and functions simply represents an opportunity for further research.  
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Given access to a sufficient corpus of naturally occurring data, fine-grained multi-modal CA 
represents a valuable method of detecting and cataloguing regularities in displays of affect by 
people with SPID, in whether, when and how support staff respond to those displays, and in 
their consequences, for both the individuals involved and the instantiation of policy-led 
practice.   
Conclusions 
Displays of affect represent a valuable resource for people with SPID who might have 
limited access to other communication strategies. However, the social function of any display 
of affect demonstrably depends upon its uptake by an interactional partner, and their response 
may be shaped by a range of factors, from normative practices to contextual and/or 
institutional concerns.  
Recommendations 
 All of the above points to two key recommendations. First, the need to examine naturally 
occurring displays of, and responses to, affect in services for people with SPID, and, in doing 
so, to conceive of emotions as distributed social phenomena. Second, the need to adopt 
methodologies capable of capturing and analysing such phenomena. Conversation Analysis 
represents one method that might meet this need, but more extensive data sets of video 
recordings of naturally occurring interactions between people with SPID and those who 
support them are required to support that task.  
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